AB 1200: Procuring Lobbyist Reform by Wiseman, Charles
The University of the Pacific Law Review
Volume 47 | Issue 3 Article 11
1-1-2016
AB 1200: Procuring Lobbyist Reform
Charles Wiseman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview
Part of the Legislation Commons
This Legislative Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in The University of the Pacific Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles Wiseman, AB 1200: Procuring Lobbyist Reform, 47 U. Pac. L. Rev. 534 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uoplawreview/vol47/iss3/11
  534 
AB 1200: Procuring Lobbyist Reform 
Charles Wiseman 
Code Sections Affected 
Government Code §§ 82002, 82039 (amended). 
AB 1200 (Gordon); awaiting Assembly concurrence in Senate amendments. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 534 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND .................................................................................. 536 
A. The Political Reform Act of 1974 .......................................................... 536 
B. Three McGeorge Law Students, Their Professor, and a Democratic 
Assembly Member Walk into a Bar ....................................................... 537 
C. Lobbyists and the PRA .......................................................................... 537 
D. Changing the PRA ................................................................................. 538 
E. The Basis of State Power to Regulate Lobbyists ................................... 540 
1. Challenges to Lobbyist Campaign Contribution Restrictions ........ 540 
2. Contingency Fee Bans and the Constitution ................................... 542 
III. AB 1200 ........................................................................................................ 542 
IV. . ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................... 543 
A. AB 1200’s Impact on New and Existing Lobbyists ................................ 543 
B. AB 1200’s Impact on Transparency in Government ............................. 544 
C. Constitutional Questions Regarding the Expansion of the PRA and 
Procurement Contracts ......................................................................... 546 
D. What is Next for AB 1200 ...................................................................... 548 
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 548 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The government’s concern over paid actors who push private agendas dates 
back to at least 1843.
1
 In Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania cautioned of the dangers of allowing a practice that “may lead to 
secret, improper and corrupt tampering with legislative action.”
2
 The 
apprehension towards lobbyists continues today, with many Americans viewing 
 
1. Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & Serg. 315, 320 (Pa. 1843). 
2. Id. 
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lobbyists as unethical, dishonest, and wielding too much power.
3
 This view is 
somewhat short-sighted and ignores that lobbyists are responsible for a lot of 
good.
4
 In large numbers, lobbyists can help legislators and agencies by reducing 
ambiguity in policy choices.
5
 Through lobbyists, legislators have access to a large 
polling sample regarding where they should align ideologically based on who is 
lobbying about an issue, and how large the group is.
6
 Regardless of how the 
general public views lobbyists, they are entrenched in both the state and federal 
governments.
7
 Lobbyist behavior is widely regulated as a response to wariness of 
their prevalence and power.
8
 
In 2014, California spent eleven billion dollars on state government 
procurement contracts.
9
 Government procurement is the means through which 
California purchases the services and goods it requires.
10
 A government 
procurement contract is an agreement between the state entity that has purchased 
the good or service, and the provider of the good or service.
11
 These contracts can 
cover a wide variety of items, from traffic cones, waffle mix, and anti-virus 
software, to helicopters, iPads, law enforcement vehicles, and loaded 
ammunition.
12
 However, under current law, a prospective contractor can pay an 
 
3. See Art Swift, Honesty and Ethics Rating of Clergy Slides to New Low, GALLUP (Dec. 16, 2013), http:// 
www.gallup.com/poll/166298/honesty-ethics-rating-clergy-slides-new-low.aspx?utm_source=honesty_and_ 
ethics_list&utm_medium=search&utm_campaign=tiles (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(only six percent of Americans polled believe that lobbyists have high or very high honesty and ethical 
standards); see also Lydia Saad, Americans Decry Power of Lobbyists, Corporations, Banks, Feds, GALLUP 
(Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147026/Americans-Decry-Power-Lobbyists-Corporations-Banks-
Feds.aspx?utm_source=too_much_power&utm_medium=search&utm_campaign=tiles (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing seventy-one percent of Americans polled believe that lobbyists 
have too much power). 
4. DONALD E. DEKIEFFER, THE CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO LOBBYING CONGRESS 5 (2007); see Newsweek 
Staff, Good Lobbying vs. Bad Lobbying, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.newsweek.com/good-
lobbying-vs-bad-lobbying-77199 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing a 
lobbyist’s work for the Human Rights Watch advocating for victims of oppression). 
5. David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the 
Bureaucracy, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 227, 228 (1995).  
6. Id. 
7. Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy, ATL. (Apr. 20, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corporate-lobbyists-conquered-american-demo 
cracy/390822/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
8. See Inst. of Gov’t Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1190 (E.D. 
Cal. 2001) (holding that lobbyist reform is a result of strong policy concerns regarding accountability and 
transparency). 
9. Video: Lobbying Transparency Would Protect Taxpayers Funds, at 00:54–55, CAL. ASSEMB. 
DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS (June 15, 2015), available at http://asmdc.org/news-room/video-gallery/lobbying-
transparency-would-protect-taxpayer-funds (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter 
Lobbying Transparency Would Protect Taxpayers Funds]. 
10. Our Key Services, DEP’T OF GEN. SERVS., http://www.dgs.ca.gov/pd/Home.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 
2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
11. Id. 
12. See State Contracts Index Listing, DEP’T OF GEN. SERVS., PROCUREMENT DIV., http://www. 
documents.dgs.ca.gov/pd/contracts/contractindexlisting.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (on file with The 
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individual to influence a government official regarding a procurement contract 
without the individual registering as a lobbyist.
13
 AB 1200 would have created 
more transparency by requiring these individuals to register as lobbyists.
14
 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Section A gives the background of the Political Reform Act of 1974 (PRA), 
and how AB 1200 attempted to amend it.
15
 Section B discusses why three 
McGeorge students pushed for the creation of the bill.
16
 Section C explains how 
the PRA regulates lobbyists.
17
 Section D addresses previous attempts to alter the 
PRA and their results.
18
 Finally, Section E discusses the constitutionality of 
regulating lobbyists.
19
 
A. The Political Reform Act of 1974 
California passed the PRA as Proposition 9 in 1974.
20
 Jerry Brown, 
California’s Governor, helped write and campaign for the PRA while he was 
California's Secretary of State and a candidate for Governor.
21
 The Act’s goal is 
to create a more transparent and responsible state government.
22
 The PRA covers 
a wide range of political reforms, including regulation of campaigns, elections, 
ethical practices, and the behavior of public officials and lobbyists.
23
 The PRA 
also created the Fair Political Practices Commission, which has the power to 
 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (listing current Leveraged Procurement Agreements); see also State 
Contract & Procurement Registration System (SCPRS) Data, DEP’T OF GEN. SERVS., http://www.dgs. 
ca.gov/pd/Programs/eprocure/SCPRSData.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2015) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (disclosing the subject of state procurement contracts and the amount of money the state 
spent). 
13. California Lobbying Disclosure, BOLDER ADVOCACY (Feb. 28, 2014), http://bolderadvocacy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/california.lobbying.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
[hereinafter California Lobbying Disclosure]. 
14. Melanie Mason, Law Students Propose Bill to Close Lucrative Capitol Lobbying Loophole, L.A. 
TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-lobbying-20150603-story.html (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
15. Infra Part II.A. 
16. Infra Part II.B. 
17. Infra Part II.C. 
18. Infra Part II.D. 
19. Infra Part II.E. 
20. About the Political Reform Act, CAL. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM’N, http://www.fppc.ca.gov/ 
index.php?id=221 (last visited July 20, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
[hereinafter About the Political Reform Act].  
21. Robert Cruickshank, Who Was Jerry Brown, CALIFORNIA NORTHERN: A NEW REGIONALISM (2012), 
available at http://calnorthern.net/who-was-jerry-brown/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
22. About the Political Reform Act, supra note 20. 
23. Id. 
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implement and enforce these reforms, as well as the ability to create new 
regulations, as needed, in line with the PRA’s goals.
24
 
B. Three McGeorge Law Students, Their Professor, and a Democratic Assembly 
Member Walk into a Bar 
While working as law clerks for the Fair Political Practices Commission, two 
McGeorge School of Law students, Robert Nash and Robert Binning, discovered 
behavior that seemed like lobbying in regards to procurement contracts was not 
actually considered lobbying under the PRA.
25
 Nash and Binning began 
researching the topic and talking with lobbyists and other capitol community 
members, because they felt there was a “much closer connection between the 
lobbying activity and the benefits received” in procurement contracts.
26
 Nash and 
Binning found that the federal government and twenty-five out of fifty state 
legislatures had already created some kind of labeling and disclosure requirement 
for lobbying activities related to procurement contracts.
27
 
Fellow McGeorge student Alexander Khan joined Nash and Binning, and 
with the help of Gary Winuk, former Fair Political Practices Commission 
enforcement chief, and through their participation in the McGeorge Legislative 
and Public Policy Clinic, the three students were able to develop their research.
28
 
Eventually, the group sought Assembly Member Richard Gordon’s support, as he 
is a respected reformer and sits on the Assembly Committee on Elections and 
Redistricting―the committee the bill would have to pass through.
29
 Nash, Binning, 
and Khan continued to stay involved with their bill as it made its way through the 
legislature, even as they studied for the July 2015 bar exam.
30
 
C. Lobbyists and the PRA 
The PRA requires an individual to register with the Secretary of State as a 
lobbyist if his or her principal employee obligations include communicating, 
whether directly or through another party, with any elected state, agency, or 
legislative official “for the purpose of influencing legislative or administrative 
action.”
31
 Registration requires lobbyists and lobbyist employers to pay a nominal 
 
24. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 83100–83112 (West 2015). 
25. E-mail from Robert Binning, former McGeorge student, to Charles Wiseman, author (Aug. 11, 2015, 
1:16 PM) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82039 (West 2015). 
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fee of $100 for both years of the legislative session.
32
 Lobbyist registration also 
places restrictions on the amount of money lobbyists can expend on gifts, travel, 
and entertainment for public officials.
33
 Lobbyists and lobbying firms are 
prohibited from entering into contingency arrangements based upon “the defeat, 
enactment, or outcome of any proposed legislative or administrative action.”
34
 
Additionally, registration prohibits former officials from influencing state 
government administrative actions for a one-year period.
35
 Currently, the PRA 
defines administrative action as “[t]he proposal, drafting, development, 
consideration, amendment, enactment, or defeat by any state agency rule, 
regulation, or other action in any ratemaking proceeding or any quasi-legislative 
proceeding.”
36
 However, this definition does not include any reference to state-
granted government procurement contracts.
37
 This allows individuals to lobby the 
legislature for procurement contracts without being labeled as lobbyists.
38
 
D. Changing the PRA 
The California legislature has made many attempts to reform the PRA with 
mixed success.
39
 Surprisingly, one of the biggest obstacles to amending the PRA 
comes from its coauthor and one of its proponents, Governor Jerry Brown.
40
 
During the 2013–2014 legislative session, Governor Brown vetoed SB 831, SB 
1442, and SB 1443.
41
 These bills would have amended the PRA in line with its 
goals of transparency and accountability.
42
 Had it not been vetoed, SB 831 would 
have “changed campaign finance rules regarding gifts and travel, behested 
 
32. California Lobbying Disclosure, supra note 13, at 6. 
33. Id. at 10–11. 
34. GOV’T § 86205(f) (prohibiting contingency fees for lobbyists and lobbyist employers). 
35. California Lobbying Disclosure, supra note 13, at 11. 
36. GOV’T § 82002(a)(1). 
37. See Delegated Purchasing Authority, DEP’T OF GEN. SERVS. (June 26, 2015), http://www.dgs.ca.gov/ 
pd/Programs/Delegated.aspx (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (making no reference to state-granted government procurement contracts).  
38. Mason, supra note 14. 
39. See generally AB 12, 2001 Leg., 2001–2002 Sess. (Cal. 2001); AB 707, 2005 Leg., 2005–2006 Sess. 
(Cal. 2005) (an act to amend the PRA that the legislature did not pass); Elizabeth Kim, The CAPS Act: Enacting 
New Barriers Between Elected Officials and Interest Groups, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 355 (2014) (detailing 
three reform bills passed by the legislature, two of which were vetoed); Ryan Matthews, SB 831: Bringing 
Political Reform into the Twenty First Century, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 368 (2014) (explaining the failure of SB 
831); Patrick Ford, Chapter 16: Combating Dark Money in California Politics, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 335 
(2014) (highlighting legislation designed to sprinkle sunshine on dark money). 
40. Robert M. Stern, What Happened to Jerry Brown, The Reformer We Once Knew?, S.F. CHRONICLE 
(Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/What-happened-to-Jerry-Brown-the-reformer-
we-581 0178.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
41. Kim, supra note 39, at 358; Matthews, supra note 39, at 384. 
42. See Kim, supra note 39, at 360 (quoting the praise of Robert Stern, coauthor of the PRA, for the 
CAPS act); Matthews, supra note 39, at 376 (stating SB 831’s goal was to prevent undue influence by special 
interests). 
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donations to nonprofit organizations, and expenditures of campaign funds.”
43
 SB 
1442 and SB 1443 comprised two-thirds of a larger bill package that would have 
made up the California Accountability in Public Service (CAPS) Act.
44
 Had the 
three bills been enacted, the package would have “barred lobbyists from paying 
for public officials’ fundraising events, increased the frequency of committee 
reporting, expanded online reporting and disclosure, an prohibited lobbyists from 
giving public officials gifts.”
45
 Although Governor Brown only signed one bill 
from the package into law, the legislature was still able to expand the PRA by 
changing the definition of “contribution” to include lobbyists hosting fundraising 
events in their home or office.
46
 
The legislature has previously attempted to amend the PRA to include 
influencing procurement contracts as behavior requiring registration as a 
lobbyist.
47
 The first was AB 13 from the 2001–2002 session.
48
 If enacted, AB 13 
would have had a similar effect as AB 1200: it would have expanded the 
definition of “administrative action” to include procurement contracts.
49
 Although 
the Assembly passed the bill 76–0, neither the Senate, nor any Senate committee 
ever voted on it.
50
 AB 707, from the 2005–2006 session, began as a bill that 
would require every “contractor, agent of a contractor, or consultant acting on 
behalf of a contractor” to publically disclose “any communication the contractor, 
agent, or consultant had with the state agency during the one‑year period 
preceding the award of the contract” within thirty days of signing a contract with 
a state agency.
51
 However, AB 707 was gutted and amended into a bill about 
vote-by-mail ballots.
52
 All language regarding procurement contracts was struck 
from the bill.
53
 
 
43. Matthews, supra note 39, at 374. 
44. Kim, supra note 39, at 360. 
45. Id., at 359. 
46. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82015(f)(2), (3) (West 2015). 
47. See generally AB 13, 2001 Leg., 2001–2002 Sess. (Cal. 2001) (an act to amend the PRA, which was 
not passed by the legislature); AB 707, 2005 Leg., 2005-2006 Sess. (Cal. 2005) (an act to amend the PRA, 
which was not passed by the legislature). 
48. AB 13, 2001 Leg., 2001–2002 Sess. (Cal. 2001). 
49. Id. 
50. Assembly Floor Vote of AB 13, Unofficial Ballot (Jan. 29, 2002), https://leginfo.legislature. 
ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?billid=200120020AB13 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review); Assembly Appropriations Committee Vote of AB 13, Unofficial Ballot (Jan. 24, 2002), https://leginfo. 
legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?billid=200120020AB13 (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review); Assembly Environmental Safety & Toxic Materials Committee, Unofficial Ballot (Jan. 
15, 2002) https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?billid=200120020AB13 (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
51. AB 707, 2005 Leg., 2005–2006 Sess. (Cal. 2005). 
52. Id. When a bill is gutted and amended, the author “remove[s] the current contents in their entirety and 
replace[s] them with different provisions.” CAL. ST. LEG., GLOSSARY OF LEGISLATIVE TERMS (last visited July 
10, 2014), available at http://www.legislature.ca.gov/quicklinks/glossary.html#G (on file with The University of 
Law Review). 
53.  AB 707, 2005 Leg., 2005-2006 Sess. (Cal. 2005). 
2016 / Government 
540 
E. The Basis of State Power to Regulate Lobbyists 
Whenever a legislative body, whether federal or state, imposes restrictions on 
lobbyists, it activates concern over whether those restrictions infringe upon the 
lobbyist’s constitutional rights.
54
 Lobbyist regulations trigger discussions 
regarding the rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the 
freedom of associational privacy under the First Amendment, as well as 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues.
55
 When a matter is brought to 
trial, the court balances the Lobbyist’s First Amendment rights and the legitimate 
public interest in curbing special interests’ influence on government affairs.
56
  
1. Challenges to Lobbyist Campaign Contribution Restrictions 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that contributing to election 
campaigns is a type of First Amendment protected speech.
57
 Thus, courts 
scrutinize any legislation that limits this right.
58
 Currently, in California, lobbyists 
are barred from making political contributions to officials and candidates they are 
registered to lobby.
59
 Courts have upheld this provision as constitutional because 
it is sufficiently narrow in that it “does not prohibit contributions by all lobbyists 
to all candidates.”
60
 Instead, the restriction “only prohibits contributions by 
lobbyists . . . to those persons the lobbyist will be paid to lobby.”
61
 Courts have 
balanced the narrow limitation with the potential for corruption and undue 
influence.
62
 Courts have found that the public has an interest in not allowing a 
lobbyist to be able to influence the government official through financial means.
63
 
 
54. Steve A. Browne, The Constitutionality of Lobbyist Reform: Implicating Associational Privacy and 
the Right to Petition the Government, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 717, 717 (1995). 
55. Id. at 737. 
56. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F. 3d 705, 716 (4th Cir. 1999). 
57. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 (1976); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 120 
(2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010); 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010). 
58. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134–35.  
59. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85702 (West 2015). The statute states: 
An elected state officer or candidate for elected state office may not accept a 
contribution from a lobbyist, and a lobbyist may not make a contribution to an elected 
state officer or candidate for elected state office, if that lobbyist is registered to lobby 
the governmental agency for which the candidate is seeking election or the 
governmental agency of the elected state officer. 
Id.  
60.  Inst. of Gov’t Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 
2001). 
61. Id. 
62. Id.; N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 168 F.3d at 716. 
63. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 168 F.3d at 716 (holding that the state has an interest in preventing 
“actual corruption and the appearance of corruption” that may arise from lobbyist’s campaign contributions). 
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Lobbyists have also suggested that regulating their contributions to officials 
is unconstitutional because it completely bans, rather than just limits, such 
contributions.
64
 Courts have rejected this argument based on the Nixon test that a 
ban is only invalid if the resulting participation is “so low as to impede the ability 
of candidates to amass the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”
65
 Courts 
have reasoned that a lack of financial assistance from lobbyists will not overly 
impair elected officials’ ability to raise contributions and run for office.
66
 
Additionally, an argument lobbyists have brought to combat restrictions is 
that restrictions on lobbyists violate the equal protection clause under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
67
 Proponents of this theory argue that restricting 
interactions between lobbyists and politicians is discriminatory.
68
 The argument 
basis is that non-lobbyist individuals have no such restrictions placed upon them 
and therefore lobbyists are placed into a separate class of individuals who have 
had their rights unnecessarily and unfairly restricted.
69
 
To address this concern, courts have applied the “rational relationship” test.
70
 
The “rational relationship” test requires the fact-finder to answer two questions: 
first, the court must identify “the goals or ends sought to be achieved or furthered 
by the statute;” second, whether the classification “rests upon some reasonable 
ground of differentiation which fairly relates to the object of the regulation.”
71
 As 
to the first question, the court has examined the strong public policy of 
prophylactically reducing the risk of corruption and undue influence in the 
government.
72
 On the second question, the courts look to the fact that lobbyists 
are a different class of individuals
73
—that lobbyists are paid to influence 
legislative or administrative action is the basis for their separate classification.
74
 
As a result, lobbyists are afforded access to government officials in a manner 
which others are not.
75
 Because of this close interaction, a higher level of concern 
for corruption exists than the average person’s interaction with a government 
official.
76
 In conclusion, the restrictions on lobbyists are appropriate because the 
 
64. Inst. of Gov’t Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1190; N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 168 F.3d at 716. 
65. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); 
Inst. of Government Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. 
66. Inst. of Gov’t Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. 
67. Id. at 1195. 
68. Id. at 1194. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 1191. 
73. Id. at 1195. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
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disparate treatment is rationally related to the goal of reducing corruption and 
undue influence in the government.
77
 
2. Contingency Fee Bans and the Constitution 
The Supreme Court has not firmly established where in the Constitution the 
right to lobby exists.
78
 However, many scholars believe that the right exists in the 
First Amendment right to petition.
79
 Lobbying can be an immensely expensive 
political endeavor.
80
 Scholars have offered contingency fees as a means to create 
easier access to the lobbying process.
81
 The argument is premised on the rationale 
that a contingency fee would allow a party to seek the assistance of a lobbyist 
without facing high entry costs.
82
 Proponents argue that without the ability to 
utilize contingency fees, some groups or individuals are unable to afford 
lobbying services, and are therefore prohibited from exercising their First 
Amendment right to petition the government.
83
 As a result, these scholars argue 
that courts should strike down prohibitions of lobbyist contingency fee 
arrangements as unconstitutional.
84
 
Courts disagree and have consistently upheld the constitutionality of 
prohibitions on lobbyist contingency fee arrangements.
85
 These courts reason that 
narrow abridgement of one’s constitutional rights is allowed if there are 
legitimate public policy concerns and the abridgement is necessary.
86
 The 
relevant public policy concern is that the government should not enforce 
contracts that may be used for improper means, even if that is not the contracts’ 
primary purpose.
87
 
III. AB 1200 
AB 1200 sought to amend the Political Reform Act of 1974, expanding the 
definition of “administrative action” to include state government procurement 
 
77. Id. 
78. Stacie L. Fatka & Jason Miles Levien, Protecting the Right to Petition: Why a Lobbying Contingency 
Fee Prohibition Violates the Constitution, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 559, 581 (1998). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id.  
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Fla. League of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir. 1996); see Associated 
Industries of Kentucky v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1995) (holding that contingency fee 
arrangements are against public policy and therefore void, and that prohibiting them is constitutional). 
86. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976). 
87. Providence Tools Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. 45, 55 (1864). 
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contracts.
88
AB 1200 would have required a person to register as a “lobbyist” if he 
or she communicated with a state government official to influence a state 
government procurement contract that exceeded $250,000.
89
 Behaviors requiring 
registration as a “lobbyist” with respect to the government procurement contract 
would have included preparing the terms or bid documents of the contract, and 
soliciting, approving, or rejecting the procurement contract.
90
 
AB 1200’s expanded definition would not have included activities such as 
submitting a bid or testifying at a public hearing about the state government 
procurement contract.
91
 AB 1200 also would have carved out an exception for 
placement agents employed by the prospective contractor.
92
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Section A discusses how AB 1200 would have financially affected lobbyists, 
lobbyist employers, and lobbying firms and how they carry out their procurement 
operations.
93
 Section B explores the impact AB 1200 would have had on 
increasing transparency in government.
94
 Section C examines the constitutionality 
of AB 1200.
95
 Section D looks at the future of AB 1200 and government 
procurement contract reform.
96
 
A. AB 1200’s Impact on New and Existing Lobbyists 
Registration as a lobbyist requires the individual to pay a $100 fee.
97
 A 
lobbyist employer must pay a $100 fee, as well as an additional $100 for each 
lobbyist employee.
98
 This registration lasts for the entirety of the legislative 
session.
99
 The rules for renewal are similar for both lobbyists and lobbyist 
employers: both must re-register before the end of the next legislative session, or 
within ten days of meeting the “time spent” threshold of a subsequent legislative 
session.
100
 Thus, the registration cost for a lobbyist employer would be at least 
$200; that figure increases with each additional lobbyist employee.
101
 For a large 
 
88. AB 1200, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Infra IV.A. 
94. Infra IV.B. 
95. Infra IV.C. 
96. Infra IV.D. 
97. California Lobbying Disclosure, supra note 13, at 6. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 86100; 86106–86107 (West 2015). 
101. Id. § 86102. 
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firm—such as Capitol Advocacy, LLC, which works with major corporations 
including American Airlines, 7-11, and Fox Entertainment, and advertises its 
experience with procurement contracts— the additional registration of employees 
who deal with procurement contracts may not have a large impact.
102
 However, 
some fear the registration requirement may harm smaller or minority lobbying 
firms, because it would be harder for smaller firms to cover these costs.
103
 
Democratic California Assembly Member, Sebastian Ridley-Thomas from Los 
Angeles, stated this fear as his reason for voting against the bill while it was in 
the Assembly Elections and Redistricting Committee.
104
  
Higher costs go against AB 1200’s stated intention of creating an equal 
playing field between big and small lobbyist employers.
105
 However, AB 1200 
would have ensured that all individuals involved in influencing procurement 
contracts over $250,000 adhered to PRA restrictions by requiring them to register 
as lobbyists or lobbyist employers.
106
 These restrictions included limiting the 
amount of money lobbyists can spend on gifts, travel, and entertainment, and 
would have prevented former officials from influencing government procurement 
contracts for a period of a year.
107
 These limitations could have helped smaller or 
minority lobbying employers by ensuring that it would cost less to get a state 
official’s attention.
108
Alternatively, AB 1200 may have had a negative impact on 
larger lobbyist employers or firms for similar reasons: firms like Capitol 
Advocacy, LLC or KP Public Affairs that advertise their familiarity with the 
procurement process would need to change their way of offering procurement 
services if they did not meet the PRA’s new standards under AB 1200.
109
 
B. AB 1200’s Impact on Transparency in Government 
One primary motivation behind AB 1200 was to create more transparency in 
the lobbying process specifically as it relates to procurement contracts.
110
 By 
requiring individuals who influence government procurement contracts over 
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$25,000 to register as lobbyists, AB 1200 attempted to shed some light onto the 
procurement process.
111
 The PRA requires registered lobbyists, lobbyist 
employers, and lobbying firms to disclose all related expenses—such as gifts, 
travel, contributions, and fees—that benefit a state official, state agency and 
legislative officials, candidates, or any immediate family of those in the 
categories listed above.
112
 In addition, AB 1200 would have provided the public 
with detailed information regarding who is influencing which bids.
113
 
AB 1200 may not have provided Californians with the level of transparency 
that the authors expected, as those looking to influence procurement contracts 
may utilize existing loopholes in the disclosure requirements of the PRA.
114
 State 
law allows lobbyists to disclose money spent under the category of “other 
payments to influence.”
115
 While lobbyists, lobbyist employers, and lobbying 
firms still must report the amount of money spent, they do not have to report 
what that money was spent on.
116
 For example, consultants who assist clients to 
understand California’s governmental structure and process, but do not operate in 
a way that would require them to register as lobbyists, are able to escape 
disclosure requirements.
117
 This loophole may mean that firms who help clients 
navigate the complexities of California procurement law without interacting with 
the agency or decision maker directly may be able to avoid having to register as a 
lobbyist.
118
 As such, the consulting party avoids the stringent disclosure and 
expense requirements.
119
 These firms often have former California legislators or 
officials on staff, so many see these firms as having an unfair advantage.
120
 Firms 
and individuals required to disclose a great deal of their lobbying activities must 
compete with those that wield similar or greater influence but do not deal with 
the same disclosure requirements under California law.
121
 Similar practices may 
have occurred under AB 1200, thus nullifying one of the primary purposes of the 
bill: transparency.
122
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C. Constitutional Questions Regarding the Expansion of the PRA and 
Procurement Contracts 
As AB 1200 attempted to expand the definition of administrative action to 
include procurement contracts, individuals, firms, and employers who were not 
considered lobbyists would have had to register as such.
123
 With this new influx 
of registered lobbyists, questions about lobbyist regulations and their 
constitutionality may have resurfaced.
124
 The expansion of the activities requiring 
lobbyist registration may have raised overbreadth concerns.
125
 To determine 
whether this was true of AB 1200, the court would have looked at the restricted 
group’s breadth and the strength of the policy considerations underlying the 
restriction.
126
Although AB 1200 would have expanded who must register as a 
lobbyist, the new label requirements still would have been sufficiently narrow 
because it only prevented some lobbyists from contributing to some candidates.
127
 
Additionally, the strong policy considerations to prevent government corruption 
remained the same as the PRA’s previous lobbyist requirements.
128
 As a result, 
the policy considerations behind AB 1200 would have likely outweighed 
concerns over a lobbyist’s freedom of speech.
129
  
AB 1200’s opponents may also argue that the bill infringes on their right to 
commercial speech under the First Amendment.
130
 Courts define “commercial 
speech” as “expression related to the economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience, generally in the form of a commercial advertisement for the sale of 
goods and services.”
131
 Procurement contracts deal with buying and selling 
goods.
132
 Therefore, any speech an agent uses to influence a state government 
official regarding a procurement contract would be considered commercial 
speech.
133
 However, courts afford commercial speech less protection under the 
First Amendment because there is potential for deception or confusion.
134
 
 
123. AB 1200, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015). 
124. Fatka & Levien, supra note 78, at 572. 
125. Inst. of Gov’t Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 
2001). 
126. Id.; N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 712–13 (4th Cir. 1999). 
127. Inst. of Gov’t Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1190; N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 168 F.3d at 716. 
128. Inst. of Gov’t Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. 
129. Lobbying Transparency Would Protect Taxpayers Funds, supra note 9. 
130. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 560 (1980). 
131. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 933 (3d Cir. 1990). 
132. Our Key Services, supra note 10. 
133. Here, the discussion refers to the specific good or service being procured and the speaker is being 
paid to speak to the state government official regarding the service or good. U.S. v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 479 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (citing a three-element test to determine whether an expression is commercial speech: (1) the speech 
is an advertisement; (2) the speech refers to a specific product or service; and (3) the speaker has an economic 
motivation for the speech). 
134. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60, 
65 (1983). 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47 
547 
Therefore, the government can limit commercial speech if a court finds that: (1) 
the government’s interest is substantial; (2) the regulation advances the 
government’s interest; and (3) the regulation is narrowly tailored to address the 
government’s interest.
135
 AB 1200 would have survived this test because 
preventing corruption in government is a substantial interest, creating more 
transparency in lobbyist activity advances this goal, and AB 1200 is sufficiently 
narrow because it would have only affected those influencing state government 
officials regarding procurement contracts.
136
 
Additionally, if lobbyists raised a Fourteenth Amendment challenge against 
AB 1200, the court would employ the “rational relationship” test.
137
 This test has 
two elements: first, the court must identify “the goals or ends sought to be 
achieved or furthered by the statute;” second, the court must determine whether 
the classification “rests upon some reasonable ground of differentiation which 
fairly relates to the object of the regulation.”
138
 As courts are likely to uphold the 
strong societal interest in keeping corruption out of government, and will likely 
view lobbyists as a special class with the ability to influence government officials 
in ways most citizens cannot, a rational relationship exists between the goals 
underlying AB 1200 and the PRA, generally, to prevent corruption and undue 
influence and the restrictions they place on lobbyists.
139
 Therefore, a Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge to AB 1200 would have been unlikely to succeed.
140
 
One particularly relevant concern is the prohibition of contingency fee 
agreements and procurement contracts.
141
 Many individuals involved in the 
procurement process rely on contingency fee arrangements to be paid.
142
 AB 1200 
would require these individuals and groups to register as lobbyists even though 
they are just selling goods.
143
 AB 1200 was amended to address this concern by 
expressly exempting “placement agents” from having to register as lobbyists.
144
 
Consequently the amendment exempted employees of the prospective good or 
service provider from needing to register as lobbyists.
145
 Instead, AB 1200 would 
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have only required those outside contractors specifically hired to influence 
government procurement actions to register.
146
 
D. What is Next for AB 1200 
AB 1200 was removed from the inactive file, and, as of this writing, is 
awaiting concurrence in Senate amendments.
147
 In the meantime, Gary Winuk, 
former Fair Political Practices Commission enforcement chief, submitted a ballot 
measure with similar language to AB 1200 to the State of California.
148
 The ballot 
measure has a wider aim than AB 1200, and seeks to reform many facets of 
California’s state government.
149
 The measure would expand disclosure 
requirements in the election process and in government decisions, as well as 
promote government accountability and ethics.
150
 Additionally, the measure 
targets individuals who leave public office in order to become a lobbyist or work 
with lobbyist groups.
151
 The proposed changes to Section 82002 of the California 
Government Code, regarding procurement contracts, are very similar to those 
changes in AB 1200.
152
 This is also reflected in the language regarding 
exemptions for bona fide salespeople—which was removed from AB 1200—and 
placement agents.
153
 It is still too early to speculate how the ballot measure will 
fare.
154
 
V. CONCLUSION 
AB 1200 would have amended the PRA regarding lobbyist registration and 
procurement contracts in a way that would not have been overly burdensome to 
the individuals affected.
155
 The changes also would have allowed smaller 
businesses and service providers to compete with larger industries.
156
 AB 1200 
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would have continued the initial goals of the PRA by increasing transparency and 
accountability in the California government.
157
 AB 1200 did not provoke any 
substantial constitutional challenges.
158
 Furthermore, AB 1200 would have closed 
a loophole in the PRA that the legislature had ignored and avoided.
159
 
Californians will have to wait to see if AB 1200 makes its way through the 
legislature: only then will the public know if Governor Jerry Brown has returned 
to his reformer roots. 
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